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NOTES
A LANDLORD'S DUTY TO PROTECT AGAINST CRIMINAL ACTS
ON PREMISES: A PROPOSAL FOR VIRGINIA
"The world abounds with laws, and teems with crimes,"1 a statement
made in 1775, applies with equal force today. No one escapes the specter
of crime. An Arlington, Virginia woman, assaulted in her apartment,
2
knows the toll crime takes. So does a woman falling victim to an attacker
in a dark Norfolk, Virginia parking lot.3
Such violence exacts a great price, not only on the victims, but on soci-
ety as a whole. In purely economic terms, crime cost Americans $350 bil-
lion in 1983." Recently landowners have faced novel litigation, and some-
times sizeable monetary judgments, aimed at holding them accountable
for criminal activity on their premises.5
This Note explores the imposition on landowners of a duty to protect
against criminal acts by third parties on their premises. First, it examines
three theories of such liability, developed by courts and commentators.
Second, it addresses the way in which Virginia courts have handled the
issue. Third, it argues that a duty should be placed on the landlord, de-
fines that duty, and suggests its adoption in Virginia.
I. THEORIES OF LANDOWNER LIABILITY FOR CRIMINAL ACTS OF THIRD
PERSONS ON THEIR PREMISES
A. No Duty
There is no duty to control the conduct of third persons.6 Historically,
1. M. REYNOLDS, CRIME BY CHOICE 11 (1985) (quoting the Philadelphia Gazette (Feb. 8,
1775)).
2. See Klingbeil Management Group Co. v. Vito, 233 Va. 445, 357 S.E.2d 200 (1987).
3. See Wright v. Webb, 234 Va. 527, 362 S.E.2d 919 (1987).
4. M. REYNOLDS, supra note 1, at 39.
5. See Haines, Landlords or Tenants: Who Bears the Costs of Crime, 2 CARDOZO L. REV.
299, 352 (1981).
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965). Section 315 reads:
There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him from
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it made sense not to hold a landlord responsible for criminal acts of third
persons on his premises. During the development of common law prop-
erty rules, the landlord had little or no control over conveyed land.7 Fol-
lowing a transfer of land to a tenant in feudal times, the landlord stepped
back, passively practicing non-interference. 8
Modern courts remain reluctant to impose a duty on a landlord to pro-
tect patrons or tenants against criminal acts.' The case most clearly artic-
ulating the no-duty concept is Goldberg v. Housing Authority of New-
ark.'0 The case involved the assault and robbery of a man delivering milk
to a tenant on the defendant's premises.1 The plaintiff milkman claimed
that the defendant had a duty to provide police protection guarding
against such criminal acts.12
In rejecting the plaintiff's claim, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
raised three obstacles to imposing a duty on the defendant landowner.13
First, the court expressed its concern over placing law enforcement in pri-
vate hands. The government alone, it emphasized, has the right and abil-
ity to maintain a police force.' 4
Second, the court claimed that any duty imposed would inevitably be
unacceptably vague. 15 This concern stems from the difficulty in determin-
ing the cause of criminal activity.6 The question becomes, if we do not
know the causes of crime, how can we decide with any certainty what is
sufficient to deter it?' 7 As the Goldberg court asked, "[how can one know
causing physical harm to another unless
(a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which imposes a
duty upon the actor to control the third person's conduct, or
(b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which gives to the
other a right to protection.
7. Haines, supra note 5, at 309.
8. Id.
9. See generally Bazyler, The Duty to Provide Adequate Protection: Landowners' Liabil-
ity for Failure to Protect Patrons from Criminal Attack, 21 ARIz. L. REV. 727, 735-36
(1979); Haines, supra note 5 at 307-09; Note, Tort Law - Merchant's Duty to Protect its
Customers from Third-Party Criminal Acts - Foster v. Winston-Salem Joint Venture, 18
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 114, 118-20 (1982).
10. 38 N.J. 578, 186 A.2d 291 (1962).
11. Id. at -, 186 A.2d at 291.
12. Id. Note that Goldberg addresses the rather narrow issue of whether a duty should be
imposed to provide a security force.
13. Id. at -, 186 A.2d at 296-98.
14. Id. at -, 186 A.2d at 296.
15. Id. at -, 186 A.2d at 297. Accord, Trice v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 14 Ill. App. 3d 97,
-, 302 N.E.2d 207, 210 (1973).
16. See Goldberg, 38 N.J. at -, 186 A.2d at 297; see also 7735 Hollywood Blvd. Venture
v. Superior Court, 116 Cal. App. 3d 901, -, 172 Cal. Rptr. 528, 529-30 (1981). See generally
Johnson, Landlord's Responsibility for Crime: Determining Legal Causation, 17 REAL EsT.
L.J. 234 (1989).
17. See Johnson, supra note 16, at 237.
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what measures will protect against the thug, the narcotic addict, the de-
generate, the psychopath and the psychotic?" 18
Third, the court insisted that the burden of a duty, if one were im-
posed, would fall upon tenants in the form of increased rent.19 One com-
mentator takes this criticism to its unfortunate extreme.2 ° The argument
posits that while rent increases may be feasible in luxury buildings, they
are impossible in the poor neighborhoods hardest hit by crime. If the
landlords in the poor areas are faced with a substantial economic burden
occasioned by a duty to provide security measures, they may simply
abandon their enterprises. The result is more homelessness, continued ur-
ban decay, and, ironically, increased crime rates.2 '
B. Limited Duty
Several courts willing to impose a duty do so reluctantly and strictly
define the circumstances under which liability will attach. Courts prefer a
narrowly drawn foreseeability requirement which demands that the land-
lord could foretell with some certainty that the victim's injury was going
to occur.2 Some courts go even further and require that the operation of
the business itself must "lure" or "abet" criminal activity in order for the
landlord to be liable.2 3
Cornpropst v. Sloan24 represents the aiding and abetting concept. The
plaintiff, Cornpropst, suffered a brutal attack in the parking lot of the
defendant mall owner. Previous assaults had occurred on the premises,
and in the areas surrounding the mall, but no security guards were
posted.25 The court held that those instances of prior conduct were irrele-
vant, stating that an indispensable element in any case such as this was a
18. Goldberg, 38 N.J. at -, 186 A.2d at 297.
19. Id. at -, 186 A.2d at 297-98.
20. See Haines, supra note 5, at 351.
21. Id. Haines, however, goes on to suggest that the standards placed on landlords need
not be exorbitant. Id. at 351-52. The suggestion applies to Goldberg. Where a duty to pro-
vide police protection would demand a great financial expenditure, the "basic protective
measures" referred to by Haines (dead-bolt locks, adequate lighting, secure windows) come
at a reasonable cost. See id. at 351.
22. Note, supra note 9, at 120; see Stripling v. Armbrester, 451 So. 2d 789 (Ala. 1984);
Latham v. Aronov Realty Co., 435 So. 2d 209 (Ala. 1983); Cook v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 354
A.2d 507 (D.C. 1976); Shipes v. Piggly Wiggly St. Andrews, Inc., 269 S.C. 479, 238 S.E.2d
167 (1977); Cornpropst v. Sloan, 528 S.W.2d 188 (Tenn. 1975); Castillo v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 663 S.W.2d 60 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983).
23. Cornpropst, 528 S.W.2d at 197; see Note: The Tort Liability of Mall Owners for the
Criminal Conduct of Third Parties, 36 DRAKE L. REv. 755, 761-63 (1986-87). Compare Mor-
ris v. Barnette, 553 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (all-night, self-service washateria was
conducive to criminal activity) with Castillo, 663 S.W.2d at 60 (mall owners not liable be-
cause they neither aided crime nor had knowledge of any imminent danger).
24. 528 S.W.2d 188 (Tenn. 1975).
25. Id. at 190.
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showing of "some mode of operation of, or condition upon the premises
that lures, aids or abets" criminal activity.2" Stripling v. Armbrester2 7
clearly sets forth the idea that in order for a duty to arise, the landowner
must have specific knowledge of prior criminal activity on the premises.
Stripling parked his car in the defendants' shopping center parking lot,
only to have it stolen, stripped and vandalized. The complaint alleged
that the defendants knew of previous auto thefts in their parking lot. The
defendants, not surprisingly, claimed to have no such knowledge.28 The
Supreme Court of Alabama held that, even though Stripling submitted a
police officer's affidavit recounting two other car thefts, several purse
snatchings, two robberies and a kidnapping, he failed to prove both that
the mall owners knew of those incidents and that they had reason to be-
lieve Stripling himself would be harmed by similar acts. 9 "Absent such
specialized knowledge," the court concluded, "the mere recital of prior
criminal activity in or around the parking lot: . . will not constitute con-
structive knowledge on the part of the defendants" sufficient to impose
liability on them.3 0
C. General Duty
Most case law expanding a landowner's duty to protect against criminal
acts of third parties on his premises arises in the commercial setting.31
The fundamental distinction between a narrow and a broad duty lies with
the interpretation of foreseeability 2 Specifically, courts supporting ex-
panded duty require only that the landowner be aware of general criminal
activity on his premises, rather than have knowledge of prior instances of
the same type that harmed the plaintiff.3 3
The Restatement (Second) of Torts lends support for broad commer-
cial landowner liability.3 4 Jurisdictions adopting the Restatement position
26. Id. at 197.
27. 451 So. 2d 789 (Ala. 1984).
28. Id. at 790.
29. Id. at 791.
30. Id.
31. See generally Bazyler, supra note 9, at 742-44; Note, supra note 9, at 122-26.
32. See Note, supra note 23, at 766-67; Note, supra note 9, at 125-26.
33. See Note supra note 23, at 766-67; see also Morgan v. Bucks Assoc., 428 F. Supp. 546
(E.D. Penn. 1977); Galloway v. Bankers Trust Co., 420 N.W.2d 437 (Iowa 1988); Foster v.
Winston-Salem Joint Venture, 303 N.C. 636, -, 281 S.E.2d 36, 40 (1981).
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344 (1965). Section 344 reads:
A possessor of land who holds it open to the public for entry for his business purposes
is subject to liability to members of the public while they are upon the land for such a
purpose, for physical harm caused by the accidental, negligent, or intentionally harm-
ful acts of third persons or animals, and by the failure of the possessor to exercise
reasonable care to
(a) discover that such acts are being done or are likely to be done, or
(b) give a warning adequate to enable the visitors to avoid the harm, or otherwise
[Vol. 24:395
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usually read it to mean that knowledge of general criminal activity suf-
fices to impose a duty to guard against subsequent, even dissimilar, crimi-
nal harm.35 Due to the Restatement's mandate, courts hesitant to hold a
residential landlord liable for criminal acts on his premises may be per-
suaded to place responsibility on commercial landowners.
3 6
Some courts, however, look beyond foreseeability and further expand
the duty to protect against criminal acts of third persons.3 " In Taylor v.
Centennial Bowl, Inc., 8 for example, the plaintiff suffered permanent
disability from an attack in the defendant's parking lot. As Miss Taylor
left the establishment, a bouncer employed by the defendant warned her
that a stranger, who had previously been verbally harassing her, was in
the parking lot.39 The Supreme Court of California ruled that the warning
to protect them against it.
Comment f elaborates:
Since the possessor is not an insurer of the visitor's safety, he is ordinarily under no
duty to exercise any care until he knows or has reason to know that the acts of the
third person are occurring, or are about to occur. He may, however, know or have
reason to know, from past experience, that there is a likelihood of conduct on the part
of third persons in general which is likely to endanger the safety of the visitor, even
though he has no reason to expect it on the part of any particular individual. If the
place or character of his business, or his past experience, is such that he should rea-
sonably anticipate careless or criminal conduct on the part of third persons, either
generally or at some particular time, he may be under a duty to take precautions
against it, and to provide a reasonably sufficient number of servants to afford a rea-
sonable protection.
35. See Note, supra note 23, at 766-71; Morgan, 428 F. Supp. at 550; Galloway, 420
N.W.2d at 440; Foster, 303 N.C. at -, 281 S.E.2d at 40; Brown v. J.C. Penney Co., 297 Or.
695, -, 688 P.2d 811, 818-20 (1984) (numerous reports of crime, similar or dissimilar, suffi-
cient to put question of liability before the jury); see also Morris v. Barnette, 553 S.E.2d
648, 650 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (duty imposed on washateria's operator if because of location,
mode of doing business, observations or past experiences he should reasonably anticipate
criminal conduct, either generally or at a particular time).
36. See Feld v. Merriam, 506 Pa. 383, 485 A.2d 742 (1984). In Feld, a couple was ab-
ducted from the parking garage adjoining their apartment complex. The complex provided
the parking service for an extra fee. Mr. Feld was abandoned on an empty street, while Mrs.
Feld was assaulted. Id. at -, 485 A.2d at 744. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which
had adopted the Restatement § 344 position in Moran v. Valley Forge Drive-In Theater,
Inc., 431 Pa. 432, 246 A.2d 875 (1968), distinguished the commercial setting from the resi-
dential setting. Feld, 506 Pa. at -, 485 A.2d at 745. The court reasoned that a merchant
invites the public and profits from their patronage. Therefore, the commercial landowner
bears the burden of protecting against the criminal harm that may inevitably occur because
"places of general public resort are also places where what men can do, they might." Id. An
apartment complex, by contrast, is not such a place. Id. The court did find liability, how-
ever, because the landlord voluntarily assumed the responsibility for a security program,
and was therefore obligated to provide it satisfactorily. Id. at -, 485 A.2d at 746-47.
37. See Taylor v. Centennial Bowl, Inc., 65 Cal. 2d 114, 416 P.2d 793, 52 Cal. Rptr. 561
(1966); Samson v. Saginaw Professional Bldg., Inc., 393 Mich. 393, 224 N.W.2d 843 (1975).
38. 65 Cal. 2d 114, 416 P.2d 793, 52 Cal. Rptr. 561 (1966).
39. Id. at -, 416, P.2d at 795, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 563.
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by its employee failed to relieve the defendant of liability.40 Furthermore,
even if the warning had adequately apprised Miss Taylor of the danger,
heeding it would have deprived her of what the court termed her "right"
to enter the parking lot and gain access to her car.41 Thus, the Taylor
court recognized a certain right to safety that a merchant must affirma-
tively protect.
The Supreme Court of Michigan, in Samson v. Saginaw Professional
Building, Inc.,42 acknowledged that "the mere fact that an event may be
foreseeable does not impose a duty upon the defendant to take some kind
of action. '43 Along with foreseeability, the court considered the magni-
tude of the risk of harm and the relationship between the defendant
landlord and the plaintiff business invitee which demanded "more than
mere observation of events."" In Samson, an employee of a tenant in the
defendant's office building was assaulted in the elevator by a patieat from
a mental health clinic also located in the building.45 The court concluded
that, the harm being foreseeable, the relationship being one where the
defendant retained control over common areas, and the risk of harm be-
ing substantial, the defendant owed two duties to the plaintiff - the duty
to further inquire into its responsibilities and the duty to reasonably pro-
tect the tenants and their invitees.46
40. Id. at -, 416, P.2d at 799, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 567.
41. Id.
42. 393 Mich. 393, 224 N.W.2d 843 (1975).
43. Id. at -, 224 N.W.2d at 849.
44. Id.
45. Id. at -, 224 N.W.2d at 845.
46. Id. at -, 224 N.W.2d at 849-50. The facts of Samson involve an office building that
leased space to, among other businesses, a mental health clinic. Mrs. Samson worked for an
attorney who also rented space in the building. She was robbed and assaulted in the elevator
by one of the clinic's outpatients. Id. at -, 224 N.W.2d at 845. In reaching its decision, the
Supreme Court of Michigan relied in part on the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 302B,
which reads:
An act or omission may be negligent if the actor realizes or should realize that it
involves an unreasonable risk of harm to another through the conduct of the other or
a third person which is intended to cause harm, even though such conduct is criminal.
Id. at __, 224 N.W.2d at 847 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 302B (1965)).
The court focused on comment 3, which states that although under ordinary circum-
stances the presumption is that no one will act criminally,
[t]here are, however, situations in which the actor, as a reasonable man, is required to
anticipate and guard against the intentional, or even criminal, misconduct of others.
In general, these situations arise where the actor is under a special responsibility to-
ward the one who suffers the harm . . . or where the actor's own affirmative act has
created or exposed the other to a recognizable high degree of risk or harm.
Id. at -, 224 N.W.2d at 847 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302B comment 3
(1965)).
In addition, the court quoted comment f, which provides:
It is not possible to state definite rules as to when the actor is required to take pre-
cautions against intentional or criminal misconduct. As in other cases of negligence,
[Vol. 24:395
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The quintessential case imposing general duty on a residential landlord
is Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp.47 Miss Kline
was assaulted in the common hallway of her apartment building, owned
and operated by the defendant.48 At the time Kline signed her lease,
seven years prior to the incident, doormen guarded the main entrance,
and an employee always manned the lobby desk. Also, the parking garage
was consistently guarded, and the third and final entrance to the building
was locked at 9:00 in the evening. By the time of the attack, no doorman
watched any entrance, the desk often sat unattended, and one entrance
stayed open at night.49 Crime in the building, of which the defendant was
aware, increased as the safeguards decreased.5
0
Holding that the landlord had a duty to safeguard the common areas
against crime by maintaining the once available security measures, the
Circuit Court for the District of Columbia cited three justifications."
First, the court reasoned that the landlord was better able than the ten-
ant to take precautionary safety measures.52 In fact, the court asserted,
the residential landlord possesses an ability to protect his tenants that
even surpasses the capabilities of the police.53 Second, the landlord, said
(see § 291-93) there is a matter of balancing the magnitude of the risk against the
utility of the actor's conduct. Factors to be considered are the known character, past
conduct, and tendencies of the person whose intentional conduct causes the harm, the
temptation or opportunity which the situation may afford him for such misconduct,
the gravity of the harm which may result, and the possibility that some other person
will assume the responsibility for preventing the conduct or harm, together with the
burden of the precautions which the actor would be required to take.
Id. at -, 224 N.W.2d at 848 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302B comment f
(1965)).
47. 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
48. Id. at 478.
49. Id. at 479.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 483.
52. Id. at 484.
53. Id. The court stated that the police "cannot patrol the entryways and hallways, the
garages and the basements of private multiple unit apartment dwellings." Id.
The concern over private police protection is a theme in the issue of landlord liability for
criminal acts on his premises. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Hous. Auth. of Newark, 38 N.J. 578, -,
186 A.2d 291, 296 (1962) ("The police function is highly specialized, involving skills and
training which government alone can provide."); Foster v. Winston-Salem Joint Venture,
303 N.C. 636, -, 281 S.E.2d 36, 42 (1981) (Carlton, J., dissenting) ("[tihe creation of myr-
iad private police forces and the shift of lav enforcement duties into the private sector
amounts to taking the law into one's own hands and contravenes public policy.").
The Kline court responded to such concerns by noting that "in the fight against crime the
police are not expected to do it all." Kline, 439 F.2d at 484. The court gave examples of
when private citizens are expected by law to reduce criminal opportunity. For example, a
car owner may be liable for damage done by a thief if he negligently allows that thief access
to his car. Id. So, said the court, "it is only just that the obligations of the landlord in their
sphere be acknowledged and enforced." Id.
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the court, impliedly contracted to provide protective measures. 4 Third,
the court compared the modern landlord-tenant relationship to the com-
mon law relationship of innkeeper-guest, where the innkeeper tradition-
ally had a duty to protect guests against criminal harm. Due to all these
factors, the Kline court decided that a landlord has a duty to exercise
"reasonable care in all the circumstances" to guard his tenants from crim-
inal injury inflicted by third persons on his premises. 6
II. A LANDLORD'S DUTY IN VIRGINIA
In determining a landlord's liability to protect against criminal acts of
third persons on her premises, Virginia differentiates the commercial
from the residential landowner." In neither case do the courts demand
much from the landlord. According to Virginia common law, a residential
landlord owes no duty of protection whatsoever to a tenant,58 while a bus-
iness invitor/landowner owes an extremely limited duty to safeguard a
business invitee. 59
A. Residential Landowners
The Supreme Court of Virginia first addressed the issue directly in
Gulf Reston, Inc. v. Rogers.60 Mr. Rogers suffered a heart attack when a
trespasser threw aluminum paint on him from the roof of his apartment
building, owned and operated by Gulf Reston. 1 The defendant was aware
of prior wrongdoing resulting from unauthorized access to the roof.2 Gulf
54. Id. at 485. For a discussion of obligations to provide security based on the implied
warranty of habitability, see Warranty of Security in New York: A Landlord's Duty to
Provide Security Precautions in Residential Buildings Under the Implied Warranty of
Habitability, 16 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 487 (1988).
55. Kline, 439 F.2d at 482-83, 485.
56. Id. at 485-86.
57. Compare Klingbeil Mat. Group Co. v. Vito, 233 Va. 445, 357 S.E.2d 200 (1987) (no
duty on residential landlord) and Gulf Reston, Inc. v. Rogers, 215 Va. 155, 207 S.E.2d 841
(1974) with Wright v. Webb, 234 Va. 527, 362 S.E.2d 919 (1987) (narrowly defined duty
imposed on commercial landlords).
58. Klingbeil, 233 Va. at 447, 357 S.E.2d at 201; Gulf Reston, 215 Va. at 157, 207 S.E.2d
at 844; see also Deem v. Charles E. Smith Mat., Inc., 799 F.2d 944 (4th Cir. 1986).
59. Wright, 234 Va. at 533, 362 S.E.2d at 922. The court stated:
[A] business invitor, whose method of business does not attract or provide a climate
for assaultive crimes, does not have a duty to take measures to protect an invitee
against criminal assault unless he knows that criminal assaults against persons are
occurring, or are about to occur, on the premises which indicate an imminent
probability of harm to an invitee.
Id.
60. 215 Va. 155, 207 S.E.2d 841 (1974).
61. Id. at 156, 207 S.E.2d at 843.
62. Young boys dropped water bags from the roof onto a shopping area, dove from the
roof into an adjacent lake, and put a hole in the Rogers' roof. Id.
[Vol. 24:395
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Reston had hired security personnel to prevent such incidents. 3
The particular incident injuring Mr. Rogers occurred during a period of
construction on the roof. The construction company left a ladder against
the wall leading to the roof. 4 The paint was used in the repair process,
and Gulf Reston did not know that it had been left on the roof."
The court identified the issue as "whether the landlord owed a duty to
protect the tenant from a criminal act of an unknown third party. 6 6 It
answered in the negative. The court stated the traditional common law
rule that there is no duty to protect another from harm inflicted by a
third person unless a special relationship exists between the parties.67 No
special relationship exists between a landlord and a tenant.66
The Gulf Reston court also addressed the issue of foreseeability.6 9 In
this case, the court decided that the defendant could not have reasonably
anticipated the misfortune that befell Mr. Rogers.7 0 The court intimated,
though, that known criminal activity in buildings located in high crime
areas may be sufficiently foreseeable.7 ' However, with no duty imposed in
the first place, the role that foreseeability might play in liability remained
unclear.
Another landlord-tenant case, Klingbeil Management Group Co. v.
Vito,7 1 followed Gulf Reston by thirteen years. Miss Vito was raped in her
apartment. The door to the apartment contained a button lock, rather
than a dead-bolt.7 After returning late one night, Miss Vito heard a
noise, prompting her to check her front door. The button was in the un-
locked position. At that point she was assaulted.74 With much reiteration,
63. Id.
64. Id. Trespassers had previously gained access to the roof by way of built-in concrete
flower boxes. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id., 215 Va. at 157, 207 S.E.2d at 844. The court quotes from the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts § 315. See supra note 6.
68. Gulf Reston, 215 Va. at 158, 207 S.E.2d at 844. The court distinguished between cases
holding common carriers liable for criminal harm inflicted by third persons on passengers by
recognizing that a special relationship exists between a common carrier and its passengers.
Id.; see Hines v. Garrett, 131 Va. 125, 108 S.E. 690 (1921); Virginia Ry. & Power Co. v.
McDemmick, 117 Va. 862, 86 S.E. 744 (1915); Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Birchfield, 105 Va.
809, 54 S.E. 879 (1906); Connell's Ex'rs v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co., 93 Va. 44, 24 S.E. 467
(1896).
69. Gulf Reston, 215 Va. at 159, 207 S.E.2d at 845.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. 233 Va. 445, 357, S.E.2d 200 (1987).
73. Id. at 447, 357 S.E.2d at 201. A button lock is located on the door knob. Turning the
key to enter the apartment does not cause the button to pop out of the locked position. Id.
74. Id. The court conceded that, even though it was not known with certainty how the
perpetrator got into the apartment, ample evidence supported a conclusion that he came in
1990]
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but no reconsideration, of Gulf Reston, the .supreme court adhered to its
position that no duty exists on the part of a landlord to protect tenants
from'the kind of harm suffered by Miss Vito.75 This time the court did
not even reach the foreseeability issue. Nothing in the facts or the opin-
ion indicated whether Miss Vito lived in the kind of high crime area that
the court had mentioned in Gulf Reston.76
On the topic of residential landlord liability, then, Virginia remains
staunchly pro-landlord. The only discussion of policy considerations in
this area has come from the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, which decided Deem v. Charles E. Smith Management,
Inc.77 in 1986, during the interim between Gulf Reston and Klingbeil.
Miss Deem also lived in Arlington, and she was raped there outside her
apartment as she walked from her parked car to the entrance of the
building.7" The court of appeals held that Gulf Reston controlled the out-
come of the case.79 In doing so, the court rejected Deem's argument that a
statutory duty imposed on the landlord to maintain the common areas in
a safe condition extended to providing physical safety from criminal
acts. s0 In its opinion, though, the court noted an underlying policy consid-
eration in deciding cases such as this one:
Virginia ... must strike the balance between the need to protect the safety
of tenants and the need to ensure affordable low and moderate income
rental housing throughout the state. The extent to which landlords are lia-
ble for third-party acts profoundly affects that equation. If landlords face
such liability, tenant safety might be greater, but rents may be higher, and
apartment units, especially in urban centers, may become more scarce. 1
Perhaps Virginia made its choice a year later with Klingbeil.
B. Commercial Landowners
The Supreme Court of Virginia turned its attention to commercial
through the front door. Id.
75. Id. The court also considered the statutory question of whether an Arlington county
ordinance requiring all exterior doors in multiple dwelling buildings to be equipped with
dead-bolt locks imposed liability on the landlord. The court held that it did not. The ordi-
nance was superseded by §§ 55.248.2 to 248.40 of the Virginia Residential Landlord and
Tenant Act of 1974, which provided that a landlord need not furnish a dead-bolt in any unit
with five or fewer apartments, and need only furnish one in larger dwellings upon receipt of
a written notice and a fee from the tenant. Id. at 448, 357 S.E.2d at 202.
76. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
77. 799 F.2d 944 (4th Cir. 1986).
78. Id. at 945.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 945-46 (citing the Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act § 55-
248.13(a)(3) (1974)).
81. Deem, 799 F.2d at 946.
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landowners in Wright v. Webb.82 Miss Webb was the victim of an assault
in the parking lot of the defendants' motel. She stopped at the motel to
ask for directions to an adjacent dinner theater, which the Wrights also
owned and for which they provided parking. On her way back to her car
she was accosted . 3 On an average of once or twice a month prior to
Webb's assault, thefts had occurred either in the rooms or in the parking
lot of the motel. In addition, a guest had been attacked in her room the
year before, and three years earlier a double murder had been committed
in an adjoining parking lot, operated by the City of Norfolk. The motel
manager knew of these prior incidents .
4
Again the court refused to recognize any special relationship that would
authorize the imposition of. a duty. 5 In doing so, the court explained its
reasoning more fully than it had in the residential cases. The discussion,
resulting in a narrowly framed rule, raised three concerns. 8 First, the
court equated the business invitor-invitee relationship with that of land-
lord-tenant. Since the mere relationship between the latter involves no
duty, neither does the former.8 7 Second, the court asked who should bear
the burden to protect against criminal acts in circumstances such as
these. Two reasons led to the conclusion that it would be unfair to place
the burden on the landowner. First, "it would be difficult to anticipate
when, where, and how a criminal might attack."' Second, the cost of pro-
viding the most effective deterrent, a private security force, would be pro-
hibitive.8 9 Therefore, concluded the court, "where invitor and invitee
[were] both innocent victims of assaultive criminals," it is unfair to place
that burden on the invitor9 0 Third, the court revisited foreseeability. In
general, criminal assaults were not reasonably foreseeable. Furthermore, a
history of property crimes failed to put one on notice of a likelihood of
physical violence. 1
Then the court narrowed the idea of foreseeability to the point that it
became almost unrecognizable. The court gleaned from common carrier
cases dealing with liability for third-party acts 2 that, in order for the
carrier to be held responsible it must have "notice of specific danger just
prior to the assault. '9 3 The court distinguished this type of immediate
82. 234 Va. 527, 362 S.E. 2d 919 (1987).
83. Id. Va. at 529, 362 S.E.2d at 920.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 531, 362 S.E.2d at 921; see supra notes 6 and 67 and accompanying text.
86. See Wright, 234 Va. at 531-32, 362 S.E.2d at 921-22.
87. Id. at 531, 362 S.E.2d at 921.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See supra, note 68.
93. Wright, 234 Va. at 533, 362 S.E.2d at 922; see Virginia Ry. & Power Co. v. McDem-
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notice from knowledge of previous criminal activity and declined to im-
pose liability solely for the latter.9 4 The resulting rule stated that
a business invitor, whose method of business does not attract or provide a
climate for assaultive crimes, does not have a duty to take measures to pro-
tect an invitee against criminal assault unless he knows that criminal as-
saults against persons are occurring, or are about to occur, on the premises
which indicate an imminent probability of harm to an invitee.95
Virginia's apparent willingness to impose liability on commercial land-
owners is a conditional willingness fraught with limitations. The Wright
rule echoes the language of the "aiding and abetting" theory,96 which ad-
dresses those "whose method of business does not attract or provide a
climate for assaultive crimes." 7 Furthermore, Wright suggests that
knowledge of previous criminal activity may never be sufficient to justify
liability. Commercial landowners in Virginia, then, possess only the nar-
rowest of duties to protect an invitee against criminal harm by third
parties.99
mick, 117 Va. 862, 86 S.E. 744 (1915). In the McDemmick case, a boarding passenger was
injured on the defendant's trolley by a man who had been arguing with the conductor over
the right to smoke a cigarette on the car. During the dispute, the trolley slipped off its track,
making it necessary for the conductor to leave the car to fix it. The man who had been
smoking blocked the exit. The conductor pushed him aside and asked another young pas-
senger to detain him until his arrest could be arranged. The young man and the smoker
then began a "scuffle," just as the plaintiff was boarding the trolley. This conflict resulted in
the smoker kicking the plaintiff. Id. at 863-64, 86 S.E. at 745.
The court absolved the defendant of any liability for the plaintiff's injury. The court held
that the conductor could not have anticipated, at the time he left the car, that such harm
would occur, and he was not able to intervene when it happened. Id. at 868-71, 86 S.E. at
747. Therefore, the carrier bore no burden to protect the plaintiff because the injury was
"unexpected and inflicted at a time when the servants of the defendant were unable to
protect" the plaintiff. Id. at 867, 86 S.E. at 746 (quoted in Wright, 234 Va. at 533, 362
S.E.2d at 922).
94. Wright, 234 Va. at 533, 362 S.E.2d at 922.
95. Id.
96. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
97. Wright, 234 Va. at 533, 362 S.E.2d at 922.
98. See id.
99. The Supreme Court of Virginia, however, recently allowed a commercial tenant to
bring suit on a breach of contract theory. See Richmond Medical Supply Co. v. Clifton, 235
Va. 584, 369 S.E.2d 407 (1988). The parties' lease included a provision requiring the land-
lord to repair a door on the leased premises. The defendant landlord failed to make the
repairs by the agreed date, and a thief broke in through the door, stealing $60,000 worth of
property. Id. at 585-86, 369 S.E.2d at 408: The court distinguished Gulf Reston, Klingbeil
and Wright because none of the defendants in those cases had expressly assumed a duty to
protect the plaintiffs. Id. at 587, 369 S.E.2d at 409. Because "contracting parties are entirely
capable of assuming duties toward one another beyond those imposed by general law," the
landlord was bound by his promise to fix the door. Id. The court remanded the case to let
the jury decide if the resulting damage was within the contemplation of the parties at the
time of contracting. Id.
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III. SUGGESTIONS AND SUPPORT
A. A Proposed Duty
A landlord should have a duty to protect against criminal acts of third
persons committed on his premises. By no means should he be made to
insure the safety of his tenants or patrons, 00 but he should be responsible
for reducing the likelihood that they will fall victim to crime on his prop-
erty. 01 The duty proposed here is that a landlord must act reasonably in
light of all circumstances to reduce the opportunity for criminals to harm
those lawfully on his premises.10
B. Support
The justification for imposing this duty already exists in case law and
commentary. Previous discussions, however, distinguished commercial
and residential settings.' 0 ' Such distinction is unnecessary. Basically, two
policy considerations justify imposing a duty on a landlord. First, the
modern conditions of both commercial and residential land use warrant
it; and second, the landlord is better able to protect against the harm by
100. Courts have long held that" a landlord is no insurer of his tenants' safety." See, e.g.,
Wagman v. Boccheciampe, 206 Va. 412, 416, 143 S.E.2d 907, 909 (1965); Revell v. Deegan,
192 Va. 428, 435, 65 S.E.2d 543, 547 (1951). For a discussion of this concept specifically in
relation to liability for third-party criminal acts, see Haines, supra note 5, at 306-45 and
Note, supra note 9, at 118-22.
101. See Lay v. Dworman, 732 P.2d 455 (Okla. 1986).
102. This proposed duty is an amalgamation drawn from the observations, suggestions
and decisions of judges and scholars. For the specific bases for this formulation, see infra
notes 128-38 and accompanying text.
103. See Note, supra note 9, at 122-26. The reasons behind imposing a duty on commer-
cial landowners are generally stated as follows:
1. An "economic benefit theory" suggests that because the landowner benefits economi-
cally from the invitor-invitee relationship, it is only fair that she should bear the resulting
burdens. Id. at 123.
2. The nature of modern commercial settings inevitably attracts criminals. Since the
landowner creates and fosters this environment, she should guard against its inherent risks
in it. Id. at 123.
3. The merchant is better able to combat the problem. She has more information about
the risks of crime and more options available to guard against it than doe- the patron. Id. at
123-24.
Kline v: 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970) best states the
bases for placing a duty on the residential landlord:
1. The landlord is better able than either the police or the tenant to safeguard areas
exclusively within his control. Id. at 484.
2. An implied contract obliges the landlord to provide for his tenants' safety. This in-
cludes the idea that a lease entails a "package of services" provided by the landlord to the
tenant, which includes protection of physical safety. Id. at 481, 485.
3. The modern landlord-tenant relationship is most analogous to the traditional inn-
keeper-guest relationship, which demands a duty of protection on the part of the landlord.
Id. at 485.
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virtue of control and economic incentive.1 0 4
1. The Modern Situation
Much justification for imposing landlord liability in the commercial
arena comes from the relatively recent phenomenon known as the shop-
ping mall. 10 5 The classic formulation of this argument states:
The modern phenomenon of merchandising and marketing through commu-
nity shopping centers has opened a new vista into the concept of tort liabil-
ity of the owners, occupiers, and possessors of public business premises. In
such centers, aptly called "cities within cities," virtually all the marketing
demands of the general public can be met on a "one stop" basis . . . The
primary incentive to the utilization of these shopping areas is the availabil-
ity of adequate and free parking facilities .... [provided] with the expec-
tancy that the tradesmen in the market places will profit by such use. Hav-
ing thus caused enormous congregations of potential and actual shoppers in
relatively compact areas, certain duties devolve upon the invitor for the
benefit and protection of the invitees. 06
In other words, "one who invites all may reasonably expect that all may
not behave," and must therefore act accordingly. 10 7
Shopping malls, of course, do not cause crime. One study, though, con-
cluded that
land use "generates" crime in a manner analogous to the way in which it
generates traffic. A commercial complex including stores and offices may
generate traffic for purposes of employment, shopping, service-seeking, ser-
vice-rendering . . . and "other" purposes, including crime.'08
Those commercial landowners who create and foster these environments
cannot eliminate crime or control the criminal, but it is fair to expect
them to operate the premises in the safest manner possible.'0 9 They can
achieve that goal by reducing the likelihood that crime will occur on their
premises.110 It has been noted that "[e]ach land use category may be per-
104. See supra note 103; see also, Bazyler, supra note 9, at 744-50. The approach taken
here is similar to, and influenced by Bazyler's interest analysis, which weighs costs and ben-
efits in deciding what duty, if any, to impose. See infra notes 105-28.
105. See generally, Note, supra note 23 (commentary specifically on imposing duty on
shopping mall owners and operators).
106. Cornpropst v. Sloan, 528 S.W.2d 188, 199 (Tenn. 1975) (Henry, J., dissenting).
107. Feld v. Merriam, 506 Pa -,. -, 485 A.2d 742, 745 (1984).
108. HARRIES, CRIME AND THE ENVIRONMENT 93 (1980).
109. See supra note 104.
110. See generally Johnson, supra note 16, at 238-41 (discussion of environmental factors
influencing criminal activity). Johnson suggests three approaches to making the environ-
ment less conducive to crime. First, increase the visibility of crime by adequate lighting or
security patrols. Id. at 239. Second, "harden" the target with measures such as locks in
residential buildings. Id. Third, manage the environment by controlling factors such as van-
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ceived as offering a set of crime opportunities,"'' and that criminal of-
fenders respond to visual cues that can deter or encourage criminal
behavior.112
While much emphasis has been placed on the uniqueness of the mod-
ern commercial environment as a justification for creating commercial
landlord duty, today's residential living also supports such a duty. The
landlord is no longer the passive conveyor of land that traditional prop-
erty law depicts him to be, although the traditional view still dominates
much landlord-tenant law."I3 He is, in reality, like an innkeeper who
maintains much control over his premises. 114 Residential landlords, in
fact, not only maintain control over common areas, but often take control
from tenants over the securing of individual apartments. For example,
there may be a fee for the installation of a dead-bolt lock."" At least one
realty company in the Richmond, Virginia area requires a tenant who
puts a dead-bolt lock on the door to relinquish a copy of the key to the
management." 6
The Oklahoma case of Lay v. Dworman"7 supports imposing a duty
based on the control that a landlord retains in the modern day landlord-
tenant relationship. That control, the court said, opens the landlord up to
potential liability for failure to maintain the controlled areas." s The Lay
rule identifies a landlord's duty as one "to use reasonable care to main-
tain the common areas of the premises in such a manner as to insure that
the likelihood of criminal activity is not unreasonably enhanced by the
condition of those common premises."''
dalism with quick repair. Id; see also Bazyler, supra note 9, at 733.
111. HARRIES, supra note 108, at 93.
112. Murray, The Physical Environment and Community Control of Crime, in CRIME
AND PUBLIC POLICY 109 (J. Wilson, ed. 1983).
113. Haines, supra note 5, at 309; see supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
114. Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 485 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
115. See Klingbeil Management Group Co. v. Vito, 233 Va. 445, 448, 357 S.E.2d 200, 202
(1987).
116. Policy of Commonwealth Realty Development Company (1988).
117. 732 P.2d 455 (Okla. 1986).
118. Idat 459. Lay was raped in her apartment. The defendants allegedly knew of and
failed to repair a defective lock on her apartment, through which, the plaintiff asserted, the
intruder entered. The case was remanded to resolve these factual questions. Id. at 459-61.
119. Id. at 458. The idea of enhancement of the risk and reduction of the opportunity for
criminal activity are synonymous. A landowner who fails to reduce the opportunity for crim-
inal activity is actually enhancing the risk that criminal conduct will occur. For this Note's
reasons for choosing this terminology, see infra notes 133-36 and accompanying text. See
also, Braitman v. Overlook Terrace Corp., 68 N.J. 368, -, 346 A.2d 76, 84 (1975) (a reason-
able person would realize "the possibility of enhanced risk that a defective lock would
create").
1990]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
2. Economics and Ability
Both in the residential and commercial settings, the landlord is in the
best position to combat crime on the premises. 20 The landlord has
greater access to information concerning crime on and around his prem-
ises, especially in the commercial environment, where victims are often
transient invitees. 1 1 Moreover, the landlord generally has control over
those areas in which crime is likely to occur (common areas of a residen-
tial or office building or parking lots in a shopping center), or over devices
relied upon to provide security, such as door locks or alarm systems."2
Furthermore, the landowner has numerous security options available,
such as providing lighting, alarm systems, security patrols and doormen
as well as changing the building design. 2 '
A landlord also has more financial control. The landlord, in either a
residential or a commercial context, benefits financially from tenants or
patrons."14 A mall owner can certainly better afford to contract for private
security protection than can a shopper. Similarly, a residential landlord is
better able to finance, for example, the rewiring of common areas to pro-
vide suitable lighting.
Economics factor into the imposition of a duty in other ways. Crime
affects landowners by raising wages that businesses must pay to attract
employees to locations where they risk criminal attack and by reducing
property values in high crime locations." 5 Patrons may avoid certain es-
tablishments after dark, and residents may move out of, or refuse to move
into, neighborhoods where they are victimized or fear victimization." 6
120. See Note, supra note 9, at 123-24; cf. Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment Corp., 439
F.2d 477, 484 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (residential landlord is better able to combat crime than
tenant).
121. See Note, supra note 9, at 123-24; see also Samson v. Saginaw Professional Bldg.,
Inc., 393 Mich. 393, -, 224 N.W.2d 843, 849-50 (1975) (implicitly acknowledging the land-
lord's informational advantage by placing a duty of inquiry on him); Bazyler, supra note 9,
at 747 (discussing landlord's liability for failure to protect patrons from criminal attack).
122. See supra notes 107-117 and accompanying text.
123. Bazyler, supra note 9, at 748; see also Note, supra note 9, at 123-24. Some fear that
placing a duty of protection against crime on a landlord encourages the proliferation of
private security forces. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. Leaving the burden on
the tenant just as conceivably could cause individual citizens to "take the law into their own
hands" as they become more fearful and frustrated with the crime in their communities.
124. Bazyler, supra note 9, at 745.
Involvement of owners of private businesses in crime reduction is especially neces-
sary. As the holders of economic power in this country, private businesses are in a key
position to help reduce the rate of crime. Involvement of those citizens who hold the
greatest amount of economic power and influence, necessarily should produce the
greatest positive effect.
Id. at 750, n.151. See also Note, supra note 9, at 122.
125. M. REYNOLDS, supra note 1, at 51.
126. Bazyler, supra note 9, at 748-49.
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Landlords can avoid these detrimental affects of crime by safeguarding
their premises. 127
C. The Formulation of the Duty
Once the imposition of a duty is justified, the question remains as to
what is a fair duty. The proposal made here has several components, each
of which will be examined.
1. Reasonableness in all Circumstances
The standard of reasonableness based on the relative degree of security
in place when the premises were initially leased, comes from Kline v. 1500
Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp."" It permits flexibility in deter-
mining liability in a particular case.-"' For example, a commercial estab-
lishment may require greater efforts to secure than an apartment unit,
and a building with fewer tenants who exercise greater control over the
premises may demand less intervention by the landlord. 130
"Reasonableness in all circumstances" purposefully does not include
"reasonableness in light of prior criminal activity on the premises." Lia-
bility should not rest with the foreseeability of crime based on previous
instances, similar or dissimilar, of crime. 131 Basing a duty to act on prior
wrongdoing in effect allows a few "free" crimes before something is
done.132 It is like requiring a certain number of accidents at an intersec-
tion before a traffic light can be put up.
2. Reducing Opportunity for Criminal Harm
Instead of holding a landlord responsible for preventing criminal activ-
ity on his premises, this duty extends only to safeguarding the environ-
ment within the landlord's control, to make it less susceptible to criminal
attack." Although some skepticism has been voiced about the effect of
127. See id. at 749-50; see also Haines, supra note 5, at 351-52.
128. 439 F.2d 477, 486 (D.C. Cir. 1970); see supra, note 56 and accompanying text.
129. See Kline, 439 F.2d at 486; see also Haines, supra note 5, at 334.
130. Haines, supra note 5, at 351-52.
131. See Samson v. Saginaw Professional Bldg., Inc., 393 Mich. 393, -, 224 N.W.2d. 843,
849 (1975) ("the mere fact that an event may be foreseeable does not impose a duty upon
the defendant to take some kind of action. . ."); cf. Goldberg v. Hous. Auth. of Newark, 38
N.J. 578, -, 186 A.2d 291, 293 (1962) ("The question is not simply whether a criminal
event is foreseeable, but whether a duty exists to take measures to guard against it.").
132. See Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hosp., 38 Cal. 3d 112, -, 695 P.2d 653, 658, 211
Cal. Rptr. 356, - (1985); see also Note, supra note 23, at 769-70.
133. See supra note 110; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 302B, comment f
(1965) ( one factor to be considered when holding one responsible for taking precautions
against third-party criminal acts is the "temptation or opportunity the situation may afford
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the physical environment on crime,"" studics have shown that the deci-
sion concerning where to commit a crime may be based on opportunity. 135
For example, a criminal may be less likely to attack a victim in a well-lit
area because he is more likely to be visible.136
3. All Persons Lawfully on the Premises
This component simply acknowledges a lack of distinction among par-
ties based on their status.137 Such acknowledgement avoids any difficulty
that may arise in determining whether a landowner owes a duty to a ten-
ant as opposed to a social guest as opposed to a business invitee as op-
posed to an employee.1 38
D. Acceptance of Proposed Duty in Virginia
Virginia's analysis of the duty owed by a landlord to protect against
criminal acts by third persons on his premises abides faithfully by the
traditional notions of the relationship between a landlord and his tenant
or invitees. 3 9 Unless the courts abandon this analysis in favor of one
based on the contemporary conditions of commercial and residential ten-
ancy, a tenant or invitee will continue to have no recourse in Virginia for
the type of criminal injury considered in this Note. °
Virginia Supreme Court Justices Poff and Stephenson endorsed the Re-
statement position' in PoIfs concurring opinion in Wright v. Webb. 42
This view, however, applies only to commercial liability and fails to recog-
nize the merits of extending liability to the residential setting. 43 The con-
currence in Wright placed great emphasis on prior criminal acts, a ration-
... for such misconduct. . ."); cf. Lay v. Dworman, 732 P.2d 455, 458 (Okla. 1986) (frames
duty in terms of enhancing the risk of criminal activity). See generally Johnson, supra note
16, at 238-41 (discussion of the interaction of the physical environment and crime).
134. See Murray, supra note 112, at 107-22.
135. Johnson, supra note 16, at 238.
136. Id. at 238-39.
137. See Bazyler, supra note 9, at 738-39; see also Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108,
443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968). Rowland rejected distinctions based on whether the
person was identified as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee, and declined to use them in deter-
mining the liability of an occupier of land in warning a guest of a dangerous physical condi-
tion on the premises. Id. at -, 443 P.2d at 565, 567, 70 Cal. Rptr. at -.
138. See Bazyler, supra note 9, at 738-39.
139. See Klingbeil Management Group Co. v. Vito, 233 Va. 445, 447, 357 S.E.2d 200, 201
(1987); Gulf Reston, Inc. v. Rogers, 215 Va. 155, 157, 207 S.E.2d 841, 844 (1974).
140. See generally Bazyler, supra note 9, at 744-50 (favoring modern interests analysis);
supra notes 103-28 and accompanying text.
141. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 344 (1965); see supra note 34.
142. 234 Va. 527, 534, 362 S.E.2d 919, 923 (1987). (Poff, J., concurring).
143. See supra notes 36, 103-28 and accompanying text.
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ale not sufficiently flexible or fair for liability in this context.144
Furthermore, little help comes from Virginia's treatment of innkeepers
and their guests. Recognition of the similarity between an innkeeper-
guest relationship and a landlord-tenant relationship may support impos-
ing liability on the landlord, because an innkeeper is generally held to a
higher standard of care.145 In Virginia, an innkeeper is under a duty to
keep his premises "reasonably safe," but he is prevented from becoming
an insurer of his guests' safety under innkeeper-guest case law. 46 Even
with an ordinary standard of care placed on an innkeeper, Virginia has
still emphasized that a landlord owes even less care, because "[a]n inn-
keeper is in direct . . . control of his guest rooms, while a lessee may be
expected to do many things for his own protection.' 47
In spite of the supreme court's reluctance to recognize a substantial, if
any, duty in this area, victims continue to bring suit, lower court judges
allow them to go to the jury, and those juries award damages. 48 Perhaps
as more people realize the fairness of holding a landlord responsible for
third-party criminal acts and continue to press the courts for relief, the
law will develop to accommodate them. This Note has suggested ways in
which the law can change and reasons why it should.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Note does not pretend to have a solution to the crime problem
facing our society today. It does not presume to identify the causes of
crime or to go the way of the "sociologist [who] is a scientist who blames
crime on everything and everyone, except the person who commits it."'
' 49
It simply suggests that, however slight the ultimate effect of imposing a
duty on landowners may be on the overall crime situation, such a legal
and fair means of minimizing crime should be implemented.
50
Bonnie McDuffee
144. See Wright, 234 Va. at 534, 362 S.E.2d at 923 (Poff, J., concurring); supra notes 131-
32 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 114-119 and accompanying text.
146. See Crosswhite v. Shelby Operating Corp., 182 Va. 713, 716-18, 30 S.E.2d 673, 674-75
(1944).
147. Id. at 715, 30 S.E.2d at 674.
148. See 4 VLW 345 (Oct. 16, 1989); 3 VLW 1067 (May 29, 1989).
149. M. REYNOLDS, supra note 1, at 57 (quoting Laurence J. Peter).
150. HARRIES, supra note 108, at 103.
1990] 413

